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ARTICLES 
RETHINKING THE RULE AGAINST 
CORPORATE PRIVACY RIGHTS: SOME 
CONCEPTUAL QUANDRIES FOR THE 
COMMON LAW 
ANITA L. ALLEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
How defensible is the prevailing doctrine that ordinary business 
corporations have no common law right to privacy? 1 Perhaps be-
cause fully explicating the reasons for denying common law privacy 
rights to corporations is an occasion for abstract jurisprudence of a 
sort for which few have the time or temperament, the doctrine has 
yet to be persuasively defended.2 Almost twenty years ago, a survey 
of authorities citing the doctrine concluded that it had been mecha-
nistically adhered to by leading privacy commentators and should 
be abandoned. 3 My own survey yields the same conclusion today, for 
throughout the 1970's and 1980's courts and others confronted with 
opportunities to consider corporate privacy rights have repeated the 
rule against them without deeply illuminating their basis in good 
legal theory or practice. 4 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. B.A., New College; Ph.D., 
University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank 
Ms. Angela Gilmore who assisted with the legal research. 
1. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 651 I comment c (1981) (corpora-
tions, partnerships and unincorporated associations have no privacy rights and no 
cause of action for invasion of privacy). But see H&M Assocs. v. City of El Centro, 
109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1980) (limited partnership may state a 
cause of action for privacy invasion). 
2. See, e.g., S. HoFSTADTER & G. HoROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 35 (1964), 
where the doctrine is mentioned but not explained. See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 
THE LAW OF TORTS 684 (1956). 
3. Comment, Corporate Privacy: A Remedy for the Victim of Industrial Espio-
nage, 1971 DuKE L.J. 391 (1971). 
4. See e.g., L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425, 
1430 (D. Conn. 1986); Barr v. Arco Chern. Corp., 529 F. Supp 1277, 1281 (S.D. Tex. 
1982); CNA Financial Corp. v. Local 743, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 515 F . Supp. 942, 
946 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Clinton Community Hospital Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medi-
607 
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The courts' refusals to extend common law privacy rights to 
corporations have often been accompanied by formalistic recitation 
of rationales, elaborated in this article, relating to the nature of the 
corporation, the purposes of the invasion of privacy tort, and the 
adequacy of existing remedies. Nonetheless, conceptual problems in 
the case for corporate privacy rights lend genuine support to their 
refusal. For example, in notable respects, ascription of privacy rights 
to corporations flies in the face of traditional understandings of the 
concept of rights that are reflected in constructive accounts moral 
and legal theorists have given of what we mean by "rights," who 
may have them, and why they are important. 5 
Still, judicial opinions refusing to extend the common law ac-
tion for privacy invasion to the corporation have not addressed the 
somewhat anomalous character of the doctrine in its contemporary 
setting. Nor have they extensively and realistically examined the im-
portance of particular forms of privacy to the business sector. Argu-
ments in favor of corporate privacy rights, stressing the value of im-
partial adjudication, the need for sufficient flexibility in the common 
law to meet the demands of policy, and the importance of respect 
for moral rights, merit clearer answers than those currently found in 
the case law. The conceptual issues implicated by the question of 
whether corporations should have common law privacy rights have 
been broached but inadequately developed by writers on corporate 
law and policy, some of whom believe corporations are properly 
ascribed all of the rights natural persons possess,6 others of whom 
view the ascription of individual privacy rights to corporations as 
taking a mere fiction too far. 7 I believe fuller development of the 
conceptual issues can help explain both the frailty and the residual 
appeal of the major recurrent conceptual grounds cited for denying 
cal Center, 374 F. Supp. 450, 456 (D. Md. 1974); N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 197 N .J. 
Super 249, 250, 484 A.2d 729, 730 (1984); Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 168 Cal 
Rptr. 361, 366 (1980) . See also R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 398 
(1980) ; B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION 
279 (1983) ; 9 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4255 
(rev. perm. ed. 1985) . Cf. Annotation , Right of Priva cy, 168 A.L.R. 446 (1974); 62 AM. 
JuR. 2D Privacy § 11 (1972); Annotation, Invasion of Privacy-Name or Likeness 30 
A.L.R. 3d 203 (1970); Annotation, Right of Privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22, 54 (1942) (repeat -
ing rule against corporate privacy action) . 
5. Cf. J . FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1981); D. LYONS, RIGHTS 
(1979) ; R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES (1979); J. WALDRON, THEORY OF RIGHTS 
(1984). Cf. Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. Pus. AFF. 321 (1975) ; Reiman, 
Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. Pus. AFF. 2 (1976). 
6. See , e.g., R. HEsSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 40-41 (1979) ("When 
individuals join together in a voluntary venture they neither gain nor lose any rights. 
Regardless of the legal form they choose for their organization .. . it can only acquire 
and exercise those rights which its members possess as individuals- nothing more 
and nothing less"). 
7. See, e.g., R. STEVENSON, CoRPORATIONS AND INFORMATION; SECRECY, AccEss 
AND DISCLOSURE 69-75 (1980) . 
-
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privacy actions to corporations. My discussion of the doctrine 
against corporate privacy rights calls particular attention to concep-
tual difficulties inherent in an aspect of jurisprudence I term the 
"theory of ascription." We engage in the theory of ascription when-
ever we systematically offer or criticize reasons of principle and ex-
pediency for refusing to ascribe particular legal rights enjoyed by 
some to new classes of entities. 
The doctrine opposing the ascription of common law privacy 
rights to corporations is not yet a hundred years old.8 The aim of 
this article is to assess the origins and justification of the doctrine 
towards a heightened appreciation of the sense it could make to rely 
upon it in a second century. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND LIMITATIONS OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 
A. The Right to Privacy 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The 
Right to Privacy in the Harvard Law Review.9 They called for the 
general recognition of a novel cause of action that had already begun 
to gain ground. 10 The new tort action was characterized as distinct 
from defamation which, they said, protected reputational and eco-
nomic interests from the injury of false publication. In terms attrib-
uted to Judge Cooley, the separate new right of privacy was to be a 
right "to be let alone."11 Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy 
rights were needed to protect humankind's spiritual nature from 
mass media and other intruders by safeguarding the interest in "in-
violate personality."12 Concretely, privacy rights would provide a ba-
sis of redress for those whose personal writings, appearances, say-
ings, acts, or domestic or other relations had been hurled before the 
public eye to satisfy "idle or prurient curiosity."13 
Most states now recognize common law privacy rights along the 
lines Warren and Brandeis proposed. The First Restatement of 
Torts acknowledged a general right of privacy protecting a diverse 
variety of interests in seclusion, anonymity and secrecy. 14 Many ju-
8. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 984-85 (W.D. Mo. 
1912) appears to be the earliest directly relevant case. 
9. Warren and Brandeis , The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) . 
10. Cf. DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (right to privacy at 
childbirth). 
11. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 9, at 195. 
12. !d. at 205. But see Green , The Right of Privacy, 27 U. ILL. L. REv. 237, 238-
39 (1952) (privacy right not sufficiently dist inguished by assertion that it protects 
interest in personality). 
13. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 9, at 213, 220. 
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 867 (1939) ("A person who unreasonably 
and seriously interferes wi th another 's interest in not having his affairs known to 
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risdictions10 and the Second Restatement of Torts16 rely on William 
Prosser's analysis/7 whereby the invasion of privacy tort actually 
consists of four separate torts: intrusion upon seclusion, publication 
of private facts, publicity placing another in a false light, and com-
mercial appropriation of name, likeness or identity. In New York, 
the cause of action for commercial appropriation of name, likeness 
or identity was created by statute. 18 In New York and many other 
jurisdictions, plaintiffs who seek to protect interests in a commer-
cially valuable name, likeness, or identity may be required to rely on 
common law rights of publicity rather than statutory or common law 
privacy rights. 19 
Under prevailing theories of recovery, a privacy claim should 
succeed if the preponderance of the evidence proves a significant, 
nonconsensual, and nonprivileged act of intrusion, publication or 
commercial appropriation by the defendant that would be highly of-
fensive to the feelings and sensibilities of a reasonable person.20 
Some courts require that plaintiffs plead special damages in addi-
tion to bare injury to feelings and sensibilities in order to state an 
action for tortious privacy invasion.21 An array of conduct has been 
held to invade privacy, including searching through a person's cloth-
ing in a public place,22 prying into an employee's sexual affairs,23 
and publishing an account of a family's financial hardships. 24 
B. Limitations on the Tort: No Corporate Privacy Rights 
Limitations associated with the common law privacy action in-
clude the restriction that privacy rights are "purely personal" and 
can only be held by a living person.211 By "purely personal" it is 
others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other"). 
15. Pennsylvania is such a jurisdiction. See Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109 
(Pa. Super. 1985). 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A(2), 652B-E (1981). 
17. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALF. L. REv. 383 (1966). \ 
18. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW,§§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). New York has not expressly 
adopted Prosser's other privacy tort actions. See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 
319, 323 (2d Cir. 1978) . 
19. Cf. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 104 A.D. 2d 213, 438 N.Y.S.2d 218 
(1984) (distinguishing right of publicity from right of privacy). 
20. See Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (newsworthiness 
and virtual consent bar recovery against sports magazine for publishing photograph 
of football fan who posed with trousers unzipped) ; Midwest Glass v. Stanford Dev. 
Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132-34, 339 N.E.2d 274, 276-78 (1975) (corporation's privacy 
injury insufficiently offensive to support an actionable claim) . 
21. See Fogel v. Forbes Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
22. Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Bodewig v. K-mart, 54 
Ore. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981). 
23. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 435 So.2d 705 (Ala. 1983) . 
24. Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 
(1984) . 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, § 651 I (1981) . See Moore v. Charles B. 
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meant that the right to privacy cannot be alienated to others by 
sale, assignment or attachment, and is not descendible property. 
The right of publicity, by contrast, is deemed to be heritable com-
mercial property which can be freely traded in the marketplace. Ac-
cording to the Second Restatement, the privacy action for commer-
cial appropriation is an exception to limitations against survival and 
alienation.26 But this now seems to be true only in jurisdictions 
where there is no wholly distinct common law or statutory publicity 
right and the commercial appropriation privacy action must do 
double duty as the remedy for injuries to both emotional and pro-
prietary interests in name, likeness, or identity.27 
The Second Restatement categorically asserts that corporations 
and other nonnatural persons are not accorded a personal right of 
privacy. 28 While a few courts have expressed or implied a willingness 
to extend privacy rights to corporations,29 many more have opined 
that corporations do not have rights of privacy, cannot acquire them 
from others, and lack standing to assert the privacy rights of their 
employees.30 
Film Enterprises, 589 S.W. 489, 491 (Civ. App. 1979); Rosemont Enterprisies Inc. v. 
Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d. 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Haines v. 
Public Finance Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 89, 218 N.E.2d 727, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 198 (1966) . 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS Sec. 652 I (1981) ("Except for the appro-
priation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be main-
tained only by a living individual where privacy is invaded") . 
27. Cf. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (commercial appropriation has been misclassified as a privacy tort by the 
courts); Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856, 862 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985) (publicity right derived from privacy right); Martin Luther King Jr. Center 
for Social Change Inc. v. American Heritage Products, 508 F. Supp. 854, 862 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981) (several states have recognized that right to publicity, while analogous to 
right of privacy, in fact protects different interest and should be separated from other 
three privacy rights) . 
28. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1. 
29. E.g., E.l. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 
1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (commercial privacy must be protected); Socialist Workers' Party 
v. Attorney General of the United States, 463 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (privacy 
right should apply to incorporated association); H&M Assocs. v. City of El. Centro, 
109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 406, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 399 (1980) (limited partnership may 
assert privacy action); Midwest Glass, 34 Ill. App. 3d at 134, 399 N.E.2d at 278 (cor-
poration could bring privacy claim if appropriate kind and degree of injury alleged) ; 
Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio Misc. 49, 61, 259 N.E.2d 522, 
534, 52 Ohio Op. 100, 112 ("right of privacy applies to individuals, corporations, as-
sociations, institutions and to public officials); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting station, 
327 Pa. 433, 445, 194 A. 631, 643 (1937) (Maxey, J ., concurring) (privacy rights sup-
ported individual's and entity's appropriation claims). 
30. See, e.g. , cases cited, supra note 4.; Eagle's Eye Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856 (cor-
poration has no protected privacy interest in its tradename); CNA Financial Corp. v. 
Local 743, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 515 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (corporation has 
no standing to assert privacy rights of its employees); Copley v, Northwestern Ins. 
Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W.Va. 1968) (disclosure of facts and statistics concerning 
matters of business nature not subject to privacy right protection); Oasis Nite Club v. 
Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Md. 1966); Maysville v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 
S.W. 369 (1944); Ass'n. for Preserv. of Freedom of Choice v. Nation Co. 228 N.Y.S.2d 
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Suggesting that limitations applicable to the right to privacy 
should be determined by experience and by analogies to the law of 
defamation and literary and artistic property, Warren and Brandeis 
took no position on whether business entities should be entitled to 
the privacy action. 31 Under the law of defamation, a corporation 
may state a cause of action when publicized falsehoods injure its 
reputation. 32 On the one hand, a case could be made by analogy to 
defamation that corporate claimants should not be barred from the 
privacy action. Warren and Brandeis expressly denied that protect-
ing reputations was to be the primary purpose of the privacy tort. 
But they could nonetheless have maintained on other grounds that 
the value of privacy to business firms, fully discernable in the 
1890s,33 argues for recognition of corporate privacy rights. On the 
other hand, the emphasis of Warren and Brandeis on "private life" 
as the preserve of humankind's spiritual nature and personality 
could be read as carrying the implication that the action they con-
ceived belongs uniquely to human beings. Yet, to quickly infer as 
much would be to beg a question that proves to be central when the 
issue of ascribing legal rights to corporations arises: ought the reality 
behind the corporate fiction, namely that the corporation is a enter-
prise of human spirit and personality, created, managed, owned, and 
operated by flesh and blood persons, derivatively entitle it to the 
legal rights and remedies humans enjoy in their individual 
capacities? 
II. THE CASE AGAINST CORPORATE PRIVACY RIGHTS 
A. The Weight of Precedent 
The weight of precedent is sometimes given as the reason for 
denying that corporations may be ascribed privacy rights. Upon ex-
amination, the case precedents cited prove to be neither numerous 
nor compelling. The action for tortious invasion of privacy is a com-
paratively recent phenomenon in Anglo-American law and few cor-
porate claimants in the United States have ever asked a court to 
consider common law privacy claims on their behalf. One frequently 
cited early authority is a case in which the court took it upon itself 
to impute and speculate about common law privacy claims the par-
ties denied having brought.34 Moreover, New York cases holding 
628, 631 (1962), Ass'n for Free. of Choice v. Emergency Civil Lib. Comm. 236 N.Y.S 
2d 216, 218 (1962). 
31. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 9, at 214. 
32. See Sack supra note 4, at 398. 
33. See Ex Parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235, 58 P. 546, 547 (1899) (disclosure of books 
and papers can embarrass a businessman and ruin his business). 
34. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 9.84-85 (W.D. Mo. 
1912). 
-
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that that state's commercial appropriation-related privacy statute 
did not create a privacy action for partnerships and corporations 
have been too readily cited as authorities for the doctrine that cor-
porations may not be ascribed common law privacy rights. 3~ Terse 
remarks in United States v. Morton Salt, 36 which concerned the in-
vestigatory powers of the federal government rather than common 
law principles, are too readily adduced as support for the doctrine 
that corporations ought not be ascribed common law privacy rights 
to redress unwanted intrusions, publications and commercial appro-
priation by private parties. 
B. Three Strikes Against Corporate Privacy Rights 
Beyond precedent, courts and other authorities have offered three 
distinct but interrelated grounds for rejecting corporate privacy 
rights. These grounds pertain to the nature of corporate personhood 
(the "metaphysical" ground); the purpose of the action in tort for 
privacy invasion (the "teleological" ground); and the adequacy of ex-
isting remedies (the ground of "parsimony"). 
1. The Metaphysical Ground 
The metaphysical ground for rejecting corporate privacy rights 
maintains that corporations cannot be coherently ascribed privacy 
rights because they are creations of public law and lack traits by 
virtue of which it makes sense to ascribe privacy rights. I refer to 
this as the "metaphysical" ground for short, because it reflects a 
theoretical conception of the fundamental essence of corporate exis-
tence. Reliance on the metaphysical ground is a striking illustration 
of the ease with which courts will assume that common law jurispru-
dence is limited by the paradigm of the natural person as the bearer 
35. See Dauer & Fittipaldi, Inc. v. Twenty First Century Communications, Inc., 
43 A.D.2d 178, 349 N.Y.S2d 736 (1973) ; Univ. of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1964), rev 'd, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 
(1965), aff'd 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965); Ass'n for Preserv. Freedom of Choice v. Emer-
gency Civil Lib. Comm., 236 N.Y.S. 2d 216 (1962); Ass'n for Preserv. of Freedom of 
Choice v. Nation Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1962); Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp, 
189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S . 2d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947); Jaggard v. R. H. Macy & Co., 
176 Misc. 88, 26 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (statute does not protect corpora-
tions); Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 A.D. 107, 158 N.Y.S. 56 (1916) (privacy statute 
does not protect partnerships). 
36. United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (validity of investiga-
tory subpoena duces tecum) ("corporations can claim no equality with individuals in 
the enjoyment of privacy .... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a 
collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artifi-
cial entities"). An earlier case slightly developed the point. Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1946) (" it has been settled that corporations are not 
entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have in 
these and related matters"). 
614 The John Marshall Law Reuiew [Vol. 20:607 
of legal rights. My concern is not to question the paradigm but to 
question reliance upon it as a rationale for limiting the legal capac-
ity of artificial entities. 
It has been argued that, even though corporations are in many 
respects treated as private institutions by our legal system and 
should be permitted to "shroud some of their activities in secrecy," 
their essential natures, as nonhuman creations of state law render it 
nonsensical to ascribe privacy rights to them. 37 Corporations are 
deemed incapable of possessing privacy rights both because of what 
they are and because of what privacy is: 
Privacy properly understood, comprehends a complex of social values 
that are embedded in the relationship between an individual and soci-
ety, values to which the fictional corporate "person" can lay no claim. 
Corporations can no more be injured by an invasion of their "privacy" 
than they can swear, scratch, make love, or engage in any of the other 
flesh-and-blood activities the walls of privacy serve to protect from 
unwanted observation.38 
Support for the doctrine opposing corporate privacy rights is 
taken from implicit adherence to the narrow conception of privacy 
cited above which excludes nonnatural persons from privacy's pur-
view. As a matter of definition, "privacy" is presumed to refer to 
human privacy. Courts imply that as a purely conceptual matter of 
which the common law should take notice, privacy applies only to 
human seclusion, anonymity and secrecy, never properly to any 
analogous state of corporate inacessibility. These assumptions give 
an air of logical necessity to the doctrine against corporate privacy 
rights which dissipates when one is reminded that more inclusive 
conceptions of privacy are not only coherently defended by aca-
demic privacy theorists,39 but are routinely utilized in other areas of 
state and federal law, examples of which I will shortly mention. 
How, precisely, have courts explained the metaphysical limita-
tion on corporate privacy rights? They have said that corporations 
are merely creations of government and are therefore essentially 
public in nature. 4° Corporations substantially lack human traits. In 
this regard it has been stressed that corporations have no feelings, 
no emotions, and no capacity for emotional suffering.41 Corporations 
37. STEVENSON. supra note 7, at 6. 
38. !d. at 69 (emphasis in original). 
39. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); R. PosNER, THE EcoNOM-
ICS OF JusTICE (1981). See generally ALLEN, UNEASY AccESS: PRIVACY FOR WoMEN IN A 
FREE SociETY (1987) (analyzing theoretical accounts of meaning of "privacy"). 
40. Vassar College at 197 F . at 984. Cf. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652 (corpora-
tions endowed with public attributes). 
41. S ee N.O.C. Inc ., 197 N.J. Super. at 249, 484 A.2d at 729; Copley v. North-
west, 295 F . Supp. 93 (S.D.W.Va. 1968); Maysville , 269 Ky. at 524, 177 S.W.2d at 369 
(1944). 
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have no peace of mind to be disturbed by privacy invasions because 
they have no mental existence.42 One court asserted that the "essen-
tial character of business does not require for its work a right of 
privacy which is afforded to an individual as a private person."43 In 
like vein, other courts have opined that certain business and educa-
tional corporations do not require privacy, but instead require pub-
licity and accessibility to the public. 44 
Although metaphysically dissimilar, corporations and natural 
persons alike possess reputations. Corporate reputations have com-
mercial value in the form of good will. Injury to corporate reputa-
tions can correspondingly injure the community standing of natural 
persons closely associated with the corporation. Nevertheless, having 
reputational interests has not enabled corporations to overcome the 
limitation barring their privacy claims. Nor has the reality behind 
the corporate fiction, that as goes the reputation of a corporation so 
goes the reputations of those who run it, seemed to help. Courts 
have argued that because corporations lack feelings, their interests 
in privacy rights to ward off and redress injury to reputation are not 
on a par with that of humans.4 ~ When combined with the argument 
that the law of defamation already provides a remedy for a corpora-
tion suffering damage to reputation, this lack of parity argument 
weighs heavily against the argument for corporate privacy rights 
that relies only on an analogy to the law of defamation. 
2. The Teleological Ground 
The second, closely related ground for denying privacy rights to 
corporations is that doing so is inconsistent with the purpose of 
ascribing such rights. I denote this the "teleological" ground, since it 
depends upon a view about the design or purpose of ascribing par-
ticular rights. The teleological ground is that corporations cannot be 
ascribed privacy rights because the purpose of common law privacy 
actions is to compensate those whose feelings and sensibilities have 
been wrongfully injured. 46 Privacy rights were not designed simply 
to compensate those who have suffered injuries to business or prop-
erty as a consequence of wrongful access. Nor were they designed to 
42. Rossenwasser, 172 A.D. at 108, 158 N.Y.S.2d. at 57. 
43. !d. 
44. Oasis Nite Club, 261 F. Supp. at 175; Vassar College, 197 F. at 985. 
45. See L. Cohen & Co. Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp 1425, 1430 
(D. Conn. 1986) 
46. See 62 AM JuR. 2D, Privacy , Sec. 11 at 692 (1972) ("The protection of the 
right of privacy afforded by the law is primarily designep to protect personal feelings 
and sensibilities rather than business or pecuniary interests" ). Accord Nizer, The 
Right to Privacy · A Half Century's Developments , 29 MICH. L. REv. 526 (1941) (gen-
erally agreed that corporations and partnerships lack privacy rights because purpose 
is to enhance human peace and happiness) . 
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protect corporations from disclosure of information collected or 
maintained in the regular course of business.47 Whereas the meta-
physical ground presumes that it is incoherent to ascribe privacy 
rights to entities that are by nature nonhuman, the teleological 
ground presumes that the common law includes a distinct purpose 
for the privacy invasion tort, that that purpose is not advanced by 
recognition of corporate privacy rights, and that therefore no rea-
sonable basis exists for extending privacy rights to corporations. 
The difficulty with the teleological ground is twofold. First, it 
implies that rights of action are strictly limited by the purposes for 
which they have been recognized in the past, seemingly and implau-
sibly rejecting the possibility that they may acquire similar or analo-
gous new purposes. Second, it implies that the privacy tort has a 
distinct purpose which became a matter of settled doctrine early in 
the life of the action, rather than a developing set of purposes sub-
ject to flexible interpretation in response to and demanded by prac-
tical concerns. Courts began to announce the purposes of the privacy 
action very early in its history. They appeared to rely on their un-
derstandings of the exact purposes to which the privacy action was 
put when first recognized as a distinct cause of action in the late 
nineteenth century, and on their reading of previous courts' and au-
thorities' self-understandings as evidenced by their writings. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to assume that the privacy tort action 
must be forever limited by its original application to the protection 
of the personal interests of natural persons; or by the assertions of 
courts, some of which, as I noted earlier, were not squarely faced 
with the task of deciding a common law corporate privacy claim. 
The implausibility of inflexible conventionalism in adjudication has 
been exposed by contemporary efforts to elucidate how judges deter-
mine what the law is and how they bring about doctrinal expansion 
and change in the common law. 48 
Resting on early authorities or on a narrow interpretation of the 
principles embodied in privacy cases, recent courts have concluded 
that the purpose of privacy rights makes it impossible to ascribe 
them to the corporate fiction. However, there is little cause to be 
satisfied with this conclusion. For it seems equally fair to conclude, 
taking a broader view, that, if the privacy tort has a purpose, it is to 
protect against losses stemming from unwanted intrusions, publica-
tions and commercial appropriations. Faced with corporate privacy 
claims, courts today reasonably view themselves as having a choice 
of whether to construe the general purpose of the privacy tort nar-
47. CNA Financial, 515 F. Supp. at 946. 
48. See generally R. DwoRKIN, LAw 's EMPIRE (1986) (theory of law, legal inter-
pretation and adjudication). 
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rowly, for the benefit of human individuals alone, or broadly, ex-
tending its protection to corporations and other nonhuman entities. 
Courts may consider intermediate selections as well. They may 
choose to construe the purpose of the action as consistent with its 
application to nonnatural ent ities that are more easily analogized to 
natural persons than are mega-corporations and conglomerates. 
These entities would include small partnerships and small, closely 
held corporations. Courts have a choice, not because our jurispru-
dence always gives them a broad range of credible choices, but be-
cause in this instance neither precedent nor other constraints rule 
out a broad construction of the principle and the purpose of the 
cause of action in question. 
3. The Ground of Parsimony 
Generally speaking, if a party has a remedy for an injury, courts 
exercise parsimony and refrain from devising additional remedies 
for the same injury. Common law courts also refrain from devising 
additional remedies where federal law preemptively governs and de-
mands that they must. 49 
The third ground for refusing privacy rights to corporations is 
the ground of parsimony, that ascribing corporations privacy rights 
would serve to create a redundant basis of liability. Courts have as-
serted that to the extent that corporations have what are called 
"privacy" interests, those interests are adequately protected by the 
common law and statutes pertaining to defamation, unfair trade 
practices, patent, copyright, appropriation, and trespass. ~o 
The redundancy claim that corporations do not need the pri-
vacy action has been disputed on the ground that a privacy action 
would provide unique advantages to the corporate victim of indus-
trial espionage.~ 1 According to one commentator, privacy rights 
49. Cf. Bender, Protection of Comput er Programs: The Copyright /Trad e Se-
cret Interface, 47 U. PITT. L. R. 903, 911-1 2 (1986) ("For a decade there was a gnaw-
ing doubt that the state trade secret law may be preempted by the federal patent 
law" ). 
50. S ee, e.g., L . Cohen & Co., 629 F. Supp. at 1430 (no right of action for pri-
vacy invasion because defamation adequate remedy). 
51. Comment, supra note 3. Cf. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christo-
pher , 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (action for appropriation of trade secret 
available to victim of aerial industrial espionage). Industrial espionage is any attempt 
at covert information gathering the purpose of which is to obtain useful facts about 
another's business. Industrial espionage is generally accomplished by obtaining direct 
or indirect sensory access to another's property or premises. In contrast, " reverse en-
gineering," which could be viewed as wrongful appropriation of valuable business in-
formation , merely involves "subjecting a product [which may have been lawfully ob-
tained] to analysis so as to discern secrets in its manufacture, operation, or 
structure. " Bender, supra note 49, at 915 n. 23. 
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would be superior to traditional trade secret rights ~ 2 and rights of 
trespass because they would not require proof of actual damages as 
a condition of recovery, and because they would allow recovery for 
theft of commercially valuable secret information that did not meet 
the strict definition of a trade secret. ~ 3 A privacy right with these 
effects would indeed provide a potentially useful (to plaintiffs) and 
not wholly redundant basis of action. 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that some courts require 
that special damages, in addition to mere acts of intrusion, publica-
tion or commercial appropriation, be pleaded as a condition of going 
forward on a privacy claim.~4 Moreover, in the past, privacy actions 
have been successful in limited instances where the information 
sought, taken, or publicized was either embarrassing or involved the 
intimacies of domestic or sex life. I have uncovered no tort case in 
which a plaintiff recovered from a defendant simply because the de-
fendant used an offensive search or surveillance to obtain useful or 
commercially valuable information. 
The privacy tort has been described as merely trespassary;M but 
in fact it has functioned more complexly to compensate unprivileged 
intrusions of a particular sort, i.e., those that create negative emo-
tions and touch on the socially defined sphere of the personal. 
Courts could begin to ascribe the privacy to corporations which have 
lost, through industrial espionage, valuable information that is 
neither embarrassing nor concerned with the intimacies of personal 
identity. But this move would involve extending the right to a new 
class of entities, and also assigning it a markedly new purpose. Cor-
porate victims of industrial espionage will not be able to hop a ride 
on the privacy wagon until and unless the courts first permit them 
to adjust the rig. 
In recent years commercial developers, marketers and purchas-
ers of computer technology and information have expressed concern 
about the existence of adequate legal protections to prevent un-
wanted accessing, usage, copying, appropriation and reverse engi-
neering. ~ 6 Could a corporate privacy action prove to be among the 
52. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 comment b (1939) (trade secrect charac-
terized as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used 
in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it"). See generally, Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
14 U.L.A. 541 (1980). 
53. Comment, supra note 3 at 407-21. 
54. See Fogel v. Forbes, 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
55. Comment, supra note 3, at 421-28. 
56. See generally, Symposium, The Future of Software Protec tion, 47 PITT. L. 
REv. 903 (1986) (exploring advantages and disadvantages of applying new law and 
traditional law-e.g., copyright, patent, and trade secret-to task of protecting pro-
prietary interests in computer programs, algorithms, machine readable information 
and computer generated works). 
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deterents and remedies needed? Corporate concern over computer-
related information and intellectual property losses have not yet re-
sulted in significant efforts to convince courts to make the privacy 
tort action available to corporations to protect their interests in 
ways copyright, trade secret, patent, trepass, and conversion do not. 
I suspect the main reason privacy tort law has not been a seri-
ous contender for the job of protecting the intellectual property of 
the computer age is that corporate attorneys do not view losses of 
software, algorithms, machine readable information, and computer 
generated works as stemming from intrusion, publication or com-
mercial appropriation sufficiently analogous to recognized common 
law privacy invasions. Alternatively, they view the injuries as suffi-
ciently analogous but reckon that the judicial doctrine opposing cor-
porate privacy rights is inimicably and irrevocably frozen in place. It 
is also possible that lawyers view corporate intellectual property 
losses as sufficiently analogous to privacy losses, but judge it more 
worthwhile to pursue novel, tailor-made remedies; existing federal 
statutory remedies, such as patent and trademark law; or state stat-
utory remedies and common law remedies under theories tradition-
ally available to commercial entities, such as the common law of 
trade secrets. 
Duncan Davidson has identified the privacy principle, "that in-
formation may only be gathered or used to a reasonable limit based 
upon the scope of ... intent," as among the legal underpinnings of 
his proposal that a "misappropriation of expression" action be avail-
able to protect unpublished computer software, on-line data-bases 
and other information and new technologies. 57 Since corporations 
are among those asserting proprietary interests in computer infor-
mation technologies, his proposal implicitly contains the notion that 
corporations have genuine privacy interests that are not adequately 
protected by existing actions but that ought to be protected. 
Davidson's proposal fell short of a specific proposal that the pri-
vacy tort action as presently constituted be opened up to corpora-
tions and others wishing to claim "misappropriation of expression." 
Reliance on the metaphysical and teleological arguments I consid-
ered earlier would give common law courts a basis for rejecting pro-
posals that commercial entities and interests be protected under the 
privacy right rubric. The lower courts could be expected to argue, as 
they have in the past, that only entities with feelings can suffer pri-
vacy invasions; that privacy consists of restricted access to the zone 
of intimacy and delicate feelings rather than simply restricted access 
to information, property and expressions; and that the purpose of 
57. Davidson , Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 PITI. L. REv. 1037, 1109 
(1986). 
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the privacy action is to redress injuries to the feelings and sensibili-
ties of natural persons. Since a number of courts have insisted that 
Prosser's commercial appropriation tort is improperly included 
among the invasion of privacy torts,ss additional misappropriation-
oriented privacy torts, intended for the protection of commercial 
and proprietary interests claimed in new technology, would doubt-
less be greeted with controversy as perhaps equally improper. 
4. Parsimony Revisted: Why Firms Bring Privacy Claims 
Notwithstanding the doctrinal obstacles and the availability of 
other legal theories, corporations and their lawyers have from time 
to time gone to the trouble of pressing privacy claims. Moreover, 
they have bothered to appeal dismissed or failed privacy claims. 
This expenditure of resources suggests that some firms have rejected 
the courts' perspective that corporate privacy interests are already 
adequately protected in the law. A more cynical possibility is that 
corporate claimants have understood that the privacy action is re-
dundant, but have sheepishly hoped to capitalize on procedural and 
strategic advantages that can be won through privacy claims. If it 
were obvious that corporations have brought-and would continue 
to bring-privacy claims only for their nuisance value or as proce-
dural ploys, the ground of parsimony constitutes a genuinely good 
reason to refuse to extend the privacy right to them. 
However, corporations have brought ill-fated privacy claims to 
achieve a variety of objectives. Privacy claims have been brought in 
an effort to buttress publicity, tradename, trespass and abuse of pro-
cess claims;69 to escape the effects of the statute of limitations that 
applies to the action for defamation;60 and to be compensated for 
surveillance, publications, and intrusions resulting in lost profits, 
lost economic opportunities, damaged reputation, civil suits and 
criminal charges.61 Corporations have attempted to bring claims 
under each of Prosser's four privacy tort categories-intrusion upon 
seclusion, publication of private facts, false light, and commercial 
appropriation. Again, doctrinal argumentation based on premises 
about corporate nature, the design of privacy law, and redundancy 
have largely prevented corporations from preserving their common 
law claims beyond motions to dismiss and summary judgment 
motions. 
58. See cases cited supra note 27. 
59. See Eagle's Eye, Inc., 627 F. Supp. at 862 (tradename); Oasis Nite Club, 
261 F. Supp. at 173 (trespass, abuse of process); Ion Equipment Corp., 168 Cal.Rptr. 
at 361, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 868. 
60. See L. Cohen & Co., 649 F. Supp. at 1430. 
61. See id.; N.O.C., 484 A.2d 729 (regulatory and zoning violations). 
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a. Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Natural persons may bring actions for intrusion upon seclusion 
when they have been subjected to highly offensive surveillance or 
searches. Although the general rule is that "[a] corporation, partner-
ship or unincorporated association has no . . . cause of action for 
any of the four forms of privacy, including intrusion upon seclu-
sion,"62 a political association in New York and a city council in 
Ohio have been held to have privacy rights against unwanted inter-
ference with seclusion.63 
Apparently, no case has held that a business corporation has a 
cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion. A number 
of cases have held that it does not. For example, a federal district 
court has held that a corporation has an action for trespass against a 
party who entered corporate premises and broke into a safe, but not 
an action for privacy invasion.64 In N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer,66 the 
New Jersey Superior Court rejected privacy intrusion claims 
brought by a corporation whose activities were subjected to detailed 
scrutiny by an adjoining landowner.66 The corporation was an oil 
transfer, treatment and storage facility. 67 When an adjoining land-
owner began to suspect the corporation of regulatory violations and 
privacy torts, she used a back-yard tree house, binoculars, a camera, 
a telescope, and a diary to observe and record the movements of 
plaintiff's employees and owners.68 Because she did not set foot on 
corporate property the corporation could not allege trespass and was 
led to attempt the unsuccessful privacy invasion action.69 
A mere legal fiction cannot be observed or searched. This pre-
mise would seem to support refusing to countenance wrongful intru-
sion claims brought in the name of a corporation. The refusal is less 
plainly warranted when we consider that such tangibles as a corpo-
ration's real estate, factories, personalty, directors, officers, and em-
ployees can be observed and searched. However, when a particular 
metaphysical understanding of the kind of thing the corporation is, 
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1981). 
63. Socialist Workers' Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 463 F. 
Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no previous case has been cited recognizing damage ac-
tion for corporation or association for privacy invasion, but right of action should 
apply as matter of reason and principle to associations); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. 
City of Dayton, 23 Ohio Misc. 49, 61, 259 N.E. 2d 522, 534, 52 Ohio Op. 2d 100, 112 
(1974) (privacy right applies to corporations, associations, institutions and public 
officials). 
64. Oasis Nit e Club, 261 F. Supp. 173. 
65. 197 N.J. Super. 249, 484 A.2d 729 (1983). 
66. !d. 
67. Id . 
68. Id. at 250, 484 A.2d at 730. 
69. !d. at 251, 484 A.2d at 731. 
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is combined with particular understandings of what "privacy" 
means and the purpose of privacy rights, it lends sense to the per-
spective that a corporation has neither privacy interests of its own 
to be injured by intrusion nor derivative privacy interests obtained 
through the human beings who own and operate it. 
The complete doctrinal argument against a corporate privacy 
action for intrusion includes points of parsimony opposing dual or 
redundant protection. Human individuals personally harmed by 
search or surveillance of corporate property or activities may bring 
privacy claims in their individual capacities; the corporation may 
sue to protect its interests under trespass, trade secret or other ap-
propriate common law theories of recovery. Consequently, the argu-
ment goes, corporations do not need the action for intrusion. 
b. Publication of Private Facts 
Early cases denied that a corporation could claim privacy inva-
sion stemming from the publication of embarrassing secrets or confi-
dences. In a Kentucky case, Maysville v. Ort,70 a city commissioner 
obtained copies of the confidential state tax reports of the Maysville 
Transit Company and included them in reports and records of the 
commission.71 Maysville's corporate tax reports found their way into 
local newspapers. 72 While Maysville brought statutory rather than 
common law privacy claims against the commissioner, the court took 
time to express its view that "if the case at bar turned upon the 
violation of a right of privacy, then the company's cause would fail, 
because such a right is designed primarily to protect the feelings and 
sensibilities of human beings, rather than to safeguard property, 
business or other pecuniary interests."7 3 
Twenty years after Maysville, a New York court held that an 
incorporated association could not maintain an action for invasion 
of privacy arising out of an allegedly libelous publication since "no 
authority is furnished to the court which grants to a corporation a 
cause of action for invasion of privacy."74 There, the court did not 
stress the general nature of corporate existence or the purposes of 
privacy law as much as the bare existence of precedent, along with 
the particular nature of the plaintiff as an organization whose ex-
press aims necessitated reliance upon "public good will" and an 
"ability to influence public opinion."7 ~ The Court seemed to imply 
70. 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944) . 
71. !d. 
72. !d. at 525, 177 S.W.2d 369, 370 (1944) 
73. !d. 
74. Ass'n . for t he Preserv. of Free. of Choice, Inc. v. The Nation Co., 228 N.Y.S. 
2d at 630. 
75. !d. at 629. 
-
1987] Corporat e Privacy Rights 623 
that such a corporation has no reasonable expectations of privacy 
with respect to its affairs. But it plainly does not follow that having 
aims that involve working with and on behalf of the general public 
obliterates any social or business need for privacy in the form of 
limited access to certain discrete business affairs. 
In Copley u. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.,76 a di-
versity action decided under West Virginia law, business partners 
alleged that the communication of " 'facts and statistics concerning 
their business' to competitors constituted an invasion or 'breach' of 
their 'rights to privacy.' "77 The court upheld defendant's motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that "the protec-
tion of the right of privacy afforded by law is primarily designed to 
protect personal feelings and sensibilities rather than business or pe-
cuniary interests . . . . "78 
Two cases involving publication of private or embarrassing facts 
suggest that corporations should be able to bring common law pri-
vacy actions. Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co.79 was 
an appeal of a trial court's dismissal of a counterclaim alleging inva-
sion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. 80 The "private 
fact" at issue was the disputed existence of an overdue debt for the 
cost of installing mirrors. 81 Faced with an action to recover the al-
leged debt, Stanford Development counterclaimed that plaintiff had 
"intentionally and maliciously published orally to various parties, 
including a customer and purchaser, ... that payment was overdue 
and a lien would be filed .. .. "82 Surprisingly, the question of the 
ability of corporations to bring a privacy action did not arise as a 
threshold matter in the court's opinion.83 This signifies that the 
court believed the corporate counterclaimant had properly stated a 
cause of action for privacy invasion. Indeed, the court concluded 
that "although an action for invasion of privacy based on the public 
disclosure of private debts may be brought in Illinois, the allegations 
contained in the counterclaim do not substantiate such a tortious 
offense. "84 
In H&M Associates u. City of El Centro,86 perhaps the most 
extensive opinion ever written on the question of common law pri-
vacy rights for business entities, a California court permitted a lim-
76. 295 F. Supp. at 93, 95 (S.D. W.Va. 1968). 
77. !d. 
78. !d. at 95. 
79. 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. 
82. !d. at 132, 339 N.E.2d at 276. 
83. !d. at 130, 339 N.E.2d at 274. 
84. !d. at 134, 339 N.E.2d at 278. 
85. 109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 167. Rptr. 392. 
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ited partnership to go forward with a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy stemming from the publication of private facts. 86 Plaintiff 
was the owner and operator of a large apartment complex who fell 
behind in making water payments assessed by the city of El Cen-
tro.87 Hoping to force foreclosure to enable the public authorities to 
acquire plaintiff's real estate cheaply, the city manager terminated 
water service without notice and after most of the sums owed had 
been tendered.88 The official then telephoned the press and plain-
tiff's creditors to announce that plaintiff owed money and had 
permantly lost municipal water services.89 
Explaining the novel holding, the court described the question 
of whether business entities ought to have common law privacy 
rights as unsettled in the law, rather than as well-established.90 The 
court rejected the metaphysical and teleological arguments that 
have captured other courts: 
Plaintiff does not seek damages for hurt feelings because of "its" right 
to be left alone for how can a partnership, distinct from its members, 
suffer humiliation or embarrassment. Here, however, the damages re-
quested relate to the partnership's economic losses-the real property 
it owned has been foreclosed. 
In the commercial world, businesses, regardless of their legal 
form , have zones of privacy which may not be invaded. 91 
c. False Light 
A very recent case holds that corporations do not enjoy the false 
light privacy right under Connecticut law.92 L. Cohen & Company 
alleged that Dun & Bradstreet prepared and distributed a credit re-
port which erroneously indicated that the company had been dila-
tory in meeting its financial obligations.93 The false light privacy 
tort was expressly invoked as the theory of recovery.94 Emphasizing 
the Restatement position that the interests of the individual in not 
being made to appear before the public in an objectionable light is 
the basis of the false light action, the court stated that "the law of 
privacy is thus concerned with the reputational interests of individ-





90. !d. at 406, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 399. 
91. !d. 
92. L. Cohen & Co., 629 F. Supp. 1425. 
93. !d. 
94. !d. at 1430. 
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ration s . " 9 ~ The court also surmised that plaintiff's privacy claim was 
a ploy to "circumvent the shorter statute of limitations applicable to 
actions for defamation. "96 
d. Commercial Appropriation 
The earliest frequently cited case for the rule that corporations 
are without privacy rights was decided in 1912.97 The case concerned 
the appropriation of the Vassar College name, emblem, and seal in 
connection with candy manufactured and sold as "Vassar Choco-
lates."98 A New York corporation, Vassar College, alleged that public 
contempt and ridicule injured its business and graduates, after its 
name and symbols were appropriated for chocolates manufactured 
by a unrelated Missouri firm. 99 Vassar denied intent to claim a right 
to privacy as such, and claimed simply that it had a right to be left 
alone for other than public purposes. 100 Arguing that the principle of 
non-interference Vassar invoked was essentially a privacy principle 
derived from cases involving privacy claims, the court concluded 
that by virtue of being both a corporation and a public entity "de-
pending upon and inviting wide-spread publicity" Vassar "could not 
well invoke the right of privacy."101 
After a New York court denied recovery in 1902 to a young wo-
man whose photograph was used without her consent for the pur-
pose of advertising flour, 102 the state legislature promptly enacted its 
privacy statute to protect against commercial appropriation of 
name, likeness or identity. In 1916, a New York court held that the 
statute does not apply to a co-partnership but could be applied "at 
the instance of a private individual to enhance his peace and happi-
ness."1 03 Subsequent cases have held that corporations are not pro-
tected by the statute.104 States adopting an identical right of action 
through judicial opinion have followed New York's unwillingness to 
extend the appropriation action to business entities. 
The separate and distinct common law right of publicity recog-
nized by the courts is sometimes described as having been "derived" 
95. fd. 
96. ld. 
97. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912)(no 
privacy interest in corporate name and symbols). Cf. Nizer, supra note 49, at 560 
(monetary value of corporate names impaired by indiscriminate use) . 
98. Vassar College, 197 F. at 983. 
99. !d. at 984. 
100. Id. 
101. !d. at 985. 
102. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
103. Rossenwasser, 172 A.D. a t 108, 158 N.Y Supp. at 57. 
104. See cases cited supra note 34. 
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from the common law commercial appropriation privacy right. 106 
The right of publicity is envisioned as protection for celebrities' 
commercial and proprietary interests. 106 It gives individuals and 
groups exclusive rights to profit by their names, likenesses, achieve-
ments, identifying characteristics, and actual performances.107 A ma-
jor difference between the right to privacy and the right to publicity 
is that the latter survives the death of persons who have achieved 
notoriety in their lifetimes and exploited its commercial value. Cor-
porations can acquire publicity rights by sale or assignment/ 08 but 
one court has held that they have no right of publicity in their own 
tradenames other than those afforded under trademark laws 
designed to protect against consumer product confusion.109 
Ill. MAKING THE CASE FOR CORPORATE PRIVACY RIGHTS 
A. Doctrinal Anomaly 
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that the doctrine against corpo-
rate privacy rights appears anomalous from some vantage points. 
Common law courts and authorities premise denial of corporate pri-
vacy rights in large part on conceptual beliefs about the inherent 
nature of corporate existence and the narrow meaning of the term 
"privacy." Yet all around, under many areas of state and federal 
law, corporations and other business entities are afforded privacy 
protection against unwanted access to information, property and 
personnel. 110 Outside of privacy tort law, it is not widely thought 
105. Eagle's Eye, 627 F. Supp. at 862 (publicity rights derived from privacy 
right); Martin Luther King Jr. v. American Heritage Center for Social Change Inc., 
508 F. Supp. 824, 862 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (several states have recognized that publicity 
right analogous to privacy right but protects different interests and should be 
separated). 
106. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835. 
107. ld. at 836. 
108. See Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1963). 
109. Eagle's Eye, Inc., 627 F. Supp at 862. 
110. While aspects of corporate privacy are widely protected in the law, corpo-
rations do not have all of the privacy rights natural persons have and labor under 
numerous disclosure requirements. Many statutes that protect individual privacy do 
not offer the same protection to corporations. See generally Prrr & H. W ACHTELL, 
PRESERVING CORPORATE CONFIDENTIALITY IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS (1980) (outlining cor-
porate rights to control over business information). The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(a), which bars disclosure of records held by certain government entities without prior 
written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains, does not include the 
corporation in its definition of "individual." Under the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3402 et seq. (1980) (Supp. 1985), the government may not have ac-
cess to the records of "any customer" of a financial institution unless the records are 
reasonably described, the customer has given authorization, or other conditions are 
met. "Customer" is defined at§ 3401 (5) of the Act to exclude corporations and part-
nerships with more than five individual partners. 
Business was subject to new federal regulation in the 1970s in many areas. The 
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that there is a purely conceptual bar either to ascribing privacy pro-
tection rights to corporations or to calling them "privacy" rights.lll 
For example, appealing to the concept of privacy, courts often 
show deference for the confidentiality of corporate records sought 
through investigatory subpoenas112 and ordinary discovery. 113 The 
provisions of a number of state statutes, federal statutes, and state 
constitutions that were enacted to protect aspects of privacy extend 
their protections to corporations. Corporations have a right to pri-
vacy under California114 and Pennsylvaniam wiretapping statutes. 
In Utah, corporations are granted certain rights of privacy by stat-
ute.116 Corporations have been held to have a right to informational 
Truth in Negotiations Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act, the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act, the Employee Retirement Income Secuirty Act, and the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act all required reporting or disclosure of information. In addition to federal 
regulations, business also faced new state regulation in the 1970s related to toxic 
waste, water resources, nuclear wastes, corporate ownership of farmland, products 
packaging and child advertising. With these new regulations came fresh demands for 
information disclosure. 
111. But see STEVENSON, supra note 7, at 69-75. 
112. See Ex Parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235, 236, 58 P. 546, 547 (1899). The court in 
Clark stated: 
The privacy of private books and papers is not only of inestimable value to the 
owner on account of various personal and sentimental reasons, but is of the 
greatest value also from mere business considerations. The exposure of a man's 
methods of business would frequently be injurious to him, and although really 
solvent, might produce embarrassments as would ruin him. His right therefore 
to the sole possession and knowledge of his private books and papers is not to 
be violated except where the power to do so clearly appears. 
!d. See also Premium Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (subpoena issued to a non-party regarding antitrust violations); In re Elec-
tric Weld Steel Tubing Antitrust Litigation, 512 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (sub-
poena issued in connection with a grand jury investigation of alleged antitrust viola-
tions). But see FTC v. Markin, 391 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (subpoena issued 
by Federal Trade Commission upheld); In re Rozas Gibson Pharmacy of Eunice, Inc., 
382 So.2d 929 (La. 1980) (subpoenas issued by state in Medicaid fraud investigation 
upheld); Commonwealth of Pa., Packel v. Shults, 26 Pa. Cornrow. 129, 362 A.2d 1129 
(Pa. 1976) (subpoena issued by Bureau of Consumer Protection upheld). Cf. Roberts 
v. Whitaker, 287 Minn. 452, 178 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 1970) (necessity of evidence out-
weighed any invasion of privacy). 
113. See Blake v. Blake, 102 N.M. 354, 695 P.2d 838 (N. Mex. App. 1985) (dis-
covery of corporate records limited to spouse's interest in corporation); Rifkind v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 177 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1981) (dis-
covery order vacated due to confidentiality of corporate information contained in pa-
pers sought in divorce proceeding); Palmer v. Servis, 393 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1981) (cor-
poration entitled to protective order). But see Merns v. Merns, 185 N.J. Super. 529, 
531, 449 A.2d 1337, 1339 (1982) (corporate form should not be used as shield behind 
which parties can conceal assets to avoid equitable distribution); Gerson v. Gerson, 
148 N.J. Super. 194, 372 A.2d 374 (1977) (where complex estate existed, there was a 
good cause shown for additional discovery). 
114. See Ion Equipment, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361, 110 Cal. App. 3d 868 (1980) (con-
struing "any person" in statute to include corporations). 
115. See Barr, 529 F. Supp. 1277 (statute contemplates that corporations have a 
right of privacy limiting wiretapping). 
116. UTAH REv STAT. (1933) §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9. 
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privacy under the Montana state constitution. 117 
Turning to federal statutes, the Federal Trade Secrets Act 
criminalizes unauthorized disclosures by federal employees of corpo-
rate trade secrets and confidential business information. 118 The Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 imposed confidentiality requirements that the 
Internal Revenue Service interpreted to apply to most information 
relating to and including individual and corporate tax returns. 119 
Federal statutes impose confidentiality rules on information ob-
tained from corporations by the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion.120 The Omnibus Crime Control Act, which safeguards against 
unauthorized wiretapping and other intrusions, extends its protec-
tions to "any individual, partnership, association, joint stock com-
pany, trust, or corporation." 121 
The doctrine opposing common law privacy rights for corpora-
tions seems particularly anomalous in view of the privacy protection 
against government intrusion corporations enjoy under the . fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 122 The fourth amend-
ment, which has been characterized as the closest thing Americans 
have to an express constitutional right of privacy, 123 has its histori-
cal roots in strong colonial sentiments for the privacy and security of 
business enterprises accomplished through limitations on the exer-
cise of governmental power. The fourth amendment appears in the 
Bill of Rights as a reaction to writs of assistance issued and enforced 
by the English Crown during the colonial era. The writs authorized 
officials to forcibly enter and search homes or commercial establish-
ments suspected of harboring smuggled goods. 124 Merchants and 
businessmen were placed at risk by the procedure inasmuch as, once 
entered, their premises and products were subject to inspection for 
compliance with the Stamp Act of 1765, the Tea Tax of 1773, and 
other parliamentary revenue measures. The 1787 Constitutional 
Convention drafted the fourth amendment as a response to the ex-
perience of arbitrary inspections by British agents.m 
117. See Mont. States Tele. and Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Serv. Reg., 634 P.2d 
181 (Mont. 1981) (corporate trade secrets protected from disclosure by public author-
ities under constitutional privacy protection provisions). 
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982) . The Freedom of Information Act exempts trade 
secrets and commercial financial information from mandatory disclosure. Cf. Chrysler 
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (Administrative Procedures Act authorizes judicial review of 
agency decisions to disclose corporate business information). 
119. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982)(Supp. 1985). 
120. 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (1982) . 
121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (6) and (11), et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1985). 
122. See generally, D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAw, AND PuBLIC PoLICY (1979). 
123. Id. at 39-41. 
124. See N. LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 51-
63, 67-69 (1937). See also Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. , 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1977). 
125. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CouRT 40-42 
(1966). 
1987] Corporate Privacy Rights 629 
Corporations are entitled to fourth amendment privacy protec-
tion where, first, there has been an actual search or seizure,126 or a 
demand to make one by a government official; or second, there has 
been a constructive search, most often where a subpoena duces te-
cum has been served upon a corporation in order to compel produc-
tion of corporate records. 127 Lower courts have sometimes held that 
corporations have fourth amendment privacy rights in a third situa-
tion, namely where corporate papers have been lawfully acquired for 
legal proceedings but the corporation requests that they be withheld 
from public disclosure. 128 The stated purposes of fourth amendment 
privacy and common law privacy are admittedly not the same. The 
former aims to limit arbitrary state power on the theory that wanton 
governmental intrusion is a political evil; the latter has been inter-
preted as aiming to guard feelings and sensibilities, on the theory 
that emotional well-being and human personhood ought to be pre-
served. Still, the coherence of fourth amendment doctrines whereby 
corporations are ascr~bed privacy rights protecting seclusion, confi-
dentiality, and secrecy highlight the implausibility of the argument 
that common law privacy rights for corporations are ruled out be-
cause "privacy" and "corporations" are conceptually inconsistent 
terms. In practice, corporations' fourth amendment privacy rights 
are less extensive than those enjoyed by natural persons. Courts de-
126. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 426 U.S. 307 (1978) (OSHA inspectors must 
acquire warrants before searching corporate premises for safety hazards and viola-
tions); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1976) (IRS 's warrantless 
entry of corporate offices and seizure of books and records violated fourth amend-
ment); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant needed for fire code in-
spections); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (warrantless investiga-
tive search of company offices unconstitutional) . But see Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States, 106 U.S. 1819 (1986) (aerial inspection not violative of warrant requirement); 
Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfafa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (warrant-
less inspection of "open field" area of corporate property does not violate fourth 
amendment). Warrantless searches of commercial property in connection with indus-
tries or activities long subject to close supervision, inspection or regulation have been 
frequently upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1971) (upholding 
warrantless search of storeroom containing unlicensed firearms); Colonnade Catering 
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1969) (upholding warrantless search of corpora-
tion violating liquor laws). 
127. See G.M. Leasing v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1976); Morton Salt, 338 
U.S 632 (subpoena valid so long as inquiry within authority of agency, demand not 
too indefinite, and information sought is relevant); Okla. Press. Pub. Co. v. Walling, 
327 U.S. 186 (1946) (subpoena is valid if agency has authority and matters specified 
are relevant) . S ee also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (order for production of 
books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within fourth 
amendment). 
128. Tavovlareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (fourth 
amendment protects corporation's privacy interest in avoiding public disclosure of 
information not used at trial). Cf. United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (fourth amendment protects church corporations' expectation of privacy in 
materials seized in criminal investigation). But see Court Ruling May Limit Corpo-
rate Secrecy Rights: Documents Unsealed in Agent Orange Case, Washington Post, 
June 24, 1987, at B12, col. 1. 
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ciding corporate privacy claims brought under the fourth amend-
ment have entertained a plenitude of considerations of policy and 
principle against particular corporate privacy claims. 129 These have 
never resulted in the absolute doctrinal bar against corporate pri-
vacy rights we find in the common law. We find instead a presump-
tion of at least nominal fourth amendment protection coupled with 
case by case or industry by industry assessment of the worth of cor-
porate privacy claims relative to particular governmental and pri-
vate ends. 
B. Corporate Preferences 
Blanket refusal to extend the common law privacy right to cor-
porations can seem anomalous from the perspective just delivered. 
It can seem simply wrong upon consideration of the special value 
various modes of privacy have for corporations and those who man-
age, own, and work for them. To be sure, seclusion, secrecy and con-
fidentiality in business can shield corporate wrongdoing such as en-
vironmental damage and employment discrimination. 130 However, 
physical seclusion and information non-disclosure can also serve 
respected ends which corporations value. 131 
The subjective importance of privacy is readily apparent in cor-
porate conduct. The preference for privacy can lead a corporation to 
sue a federal agency, 132 pull out of a financial transaction, 133 or seek 
a protective order in litigation.134 
Directors and officers of closely held corporations extol the rela-
tively greater efficiency, managerial freedom and personal privacy 
they have when compared to their counterparts in heavily regulated 
public corporations.136 Full and complete disclosure in many areas is 
129. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. United States, 106 U.S. 1819 (1986) (warrantless 
aerial surveillance of corporate facility not a violation of fourth amendment). 
130. Nader, Corporate Disclosure: The Public Right to Know , 7 J. CONT. Bus. 
25 (1925). 
131. See generally STEVENSON, supra note 7; F. BALDWIN, CoNFLICTING INTER-
ESTS: CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE CONTROVERSIES (1980). 
132. S&L Withraws Suit Against FHLBB, Washington Post, July 30, 1987, at 
B1, col. 1. ("Lincoln Savings & Loan of Irvine, California accused the bank board of 
leaking trade secrets and other confidential data obtained during a federal audit of 
the S&L.") (suit withdrawn when agency promised not to leak confidences to press). 
133. Mintz, Manufacturers Pulls Out of Robbins Syndicate, Washington Post, 
August 5, 1987, at F3, col. 3. (Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. withdrew as syndi-
cate leader in A.H. Robbins bankruptcy reorganization rather than reveal to attor-
neys of Dalkon shield-plaintiffs secret bank examiners' reports held by Federal Re-
serve system and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. which concluded bank could make 
good on $1.675 billion letter of credit). 
134. Mintz, Court Ruling May Limit Corporate Secrecy Rights: Documents 
Unsealed in Agent Orange Case, Washington Post, June 24, 1987, at B12, col. 1. 
135. See Levy, The Free World of Private Companies, 112 DuN's REVIEW 56-62 
(Sept. 1978). 
-
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required of publicly held corporations. Quarterly and annual re-
ports, investment disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, annual meetings, and proxy statements all entail revelation 
of "innermost financial secrets."136 Some managers view government 
disclosure requirements as tantamount to letting "your competition 
walk though your plant. " 137 Corporate managers must live in the 
"executive goldfish bowl,"138 even though, "for many reasons that 
touch at the heart of laissez-faire individualism, businessmen prize 
their privacy more than anything else."139 
C. Economic Policy 
Richard Posner has argued that because society has even more 
of a value at stake in the protection of the privacy of commercial 
entities than that of natural persons, businesses ought to have much 
of the privacy and privacy protection it wants. 140 According to Pos-
ner, in private life secrecy is more likely to conceal "bad" facts that 
cause others to overvalue what one is or does. In business, secrecy 
often conceals "good" facts, facts pertaining to the methods of so-
cially productive activity. Firms whose commercial privacy is pro-
tected can profit from their investments in research and innovation. 
The ability to profit creates incentives for firms to invest resources 
in useful innovation. Moreover, with secrecy it is possible to avoid 
unwanted publicity that can stymie communications that are a part 
of efficient corporate decisionmaking. Presumably, in the long run, 
such efficiencies benefit the greater society. 
136. ld. Also, corporations' own discretionary business transactions inevitably 
disperse corporate secrets. See New York Times, May 18, 1986, at Cl (merger and 
acquisition practices result in dissemination of corporate secrets to host of partici-
pants, including corporate insiders, investment banks, lenders, public relations advi-
sors, law firms, bond dealers, proxy solicitors, document printers, secretaries, families, 
friends, arbitrageurs). 
137. Levy, supra note 135. 
138. McGrath and Flanagan, The Executive Goldfish Bowl, 135 FoRBES 154 
(Feb. 11, 1985). Information about corporate executives, like other middle-and upp-
per-income bracket Americans, is in the hands of credit bureaus, credit card compa-
nies, retailers, banks, utility companies, landlords, oil companies, insurers, govern-
ment agencies, and motor vehicle bureaus. However, if an individual is a top 
executive of a publicly traded firm , the Securities and Exchange Commission will 
maintain salary and stock ownership information. If the firm is a defense contractor 
or subcontractor, the Department of Defense will know income, medical history, edu-
cational and military records, job history, family tree, foreign travel, and reputation 
in the community. 
139. Levy, supra note 135. 
140. R. PosNER, EcoNOMICS OF ,JusTICE (1981). See also Posner, The Right to 
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation, 28 BuF. 
L. REv. 1, 50-53 (1979) (business organizations should have their innovative facts 
shielded from involuntary disclosure). But see Blaustein, Privacy is Dear, 12 GA. L. 
REv. 429, 440-41 (1978) ; D'Arnato, Comment on Posner, 12 GA. L. REv. 497, 499-500 
(1978). 
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If the corporate privacy action were wholly redundant, offering 
plaintiffs the same prophylactic protection and remedies offered by 
existing remedies, there would be little cause for thinking that a cor-
porate privacy right would promote new economic efficiencies. Ex 
hypothes, case corporations would already have all the legal privacy 
protection the privacy right could give them. We thus expect an eco-
nomic policy argument for extending the privacy tort to corpora-
tions to specify the privacy-related economic goals that should be 
but are not protected under existing law. 141 Proponents of an eco-
nomic policy argument would still have to contend with the force of 
the conceptual metaphysical arguments against corporate privacy 
rights, a point I will return to later. 
It is not clear under what circumstances a judicial decision to 
extend privacy protections to corporations would promote economic 
values about which the public generally cares. Consider H&M Asso-
ciates, the path-breaking California case extending privacy rights to 
a limited partnership whose potential financing and sales contracts 
fell through when a city manager seeking foreclosure maliciously 
publicized its indebtedness. Is the case an example of a court inter-
preting legal rules in a way calculated to promote economic effi-
ciency?142 It could be argued that indebtedness is generally a "bad" 
fact about which others ought to know so they can protect them-
selves from wasted contracts, collaboration and investment? Is se-
crecy about a present debt desirable, however, if it has the potential 
to prolong the life of a business, enabling it to prosper and contrib-
ute? The H&M Associates court may have had this in mind. But the 
case could be seen as an effort to punish malicious disclosure for its 
own sake. 
A priori, one cannot be too sure that a common law right of 
corporate privacy would significantly contribute to helping the busi-
ness community achieve the freedom from intrusion, publicity and 
commercial appropriation it collectively desires. It is conceivable 
that a number of court decisions holding companies liable for sur-
reptitious theft of business information or obtaining confidential in-
formation from employees hired away from competitors, could make 
these practices less prevalent and thereby increase the rewards of 
research and innovation. However, the business community is de-
pendent upon competitive information gathering and could there-
fore be expected to respond to new legal rights to enforce an eco-
141. Protection against monetary losses associated with industrial espionage 
and loss of control over new technology are two possible such interests. 
142. M. KuPERBERG AND C. BEITZ, LAw, EcoNOMICS, AND PHILOSPHY 3 (1983) 
(positive thesis of economic approach is that development of Anglo-American law can 
be understood as a continuing accomodation to changing social and economic circum-
stances by judges interpreting legal rules to produce economically efficient outcomes). 
-
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nomrc policy or management preference for pnvacy with 
ambivalence. After all, a right protecting privacy is also a right 
which potentially leads to liability for invading privacy. 
A survey of American firms conducted a number of years ago 
measured the incidence of competitive information gathering. The 
survey, which also identified the methods of information gathering 
companies used and the type of information sought, suggested that 
management regards information about product styling, manufac-
turing processes, patents and infringements, pricing, expansion 
plans, competitive plans, promotional strategies and cost data as 
"extremely important" to what they do. 143 While utilizing published 
sources to obtain the information management feels it needs to 
know was reportedly the most typical method of information gather-
ing, undercover espionage and hiring away employees privy to com-
petitive information were significantly employed.144 
D. Generic Arguments for Corporate Privacy Rights 
At least three generic clusters of colorable arguments oppose 
the prevailing doctrine and lend support to the recognition of com-
mon law corporate privacy rights. They are the "equivalent injury" 
argument, the "social policy" argument, and the "moral rights" ar-
gument. I will briefly offer perspectives on how well arguments de-
veloped along these lines could be expected to stand up to scrutiny. 
1. Equivalent Injury 
The "equivalent injury" argument proceeds as follows. Quan-
titatively significant losses of privacy by individual human beings 
that are proximately caused by others' highly offensive intentional 
acts of intrusion, publication or appropriation are injuries for which 
compensation may be brought through common law civil actions for 
privacy invasion. Like human individuals, corporations can and do 
experience significant losses of privacy proximately caused by 
others' highly offensive intentional acts. Therefore, corporations 
ought similarly to be able to seek compensation through the com-
mon law civil action for privacy invasion. 
If the equivalent injury argument has the ring of formalism, it is 
chiefly due to the simplistic manner in which I have sketched what 
could be developed into a more complete and compelling argument 
of principle. The equivalent injury argument need not be under-
stood as mere formalism; it can be read, more charitably, as capable 
143. Wall, What the Competition is Doing: Your Need to Know, 52 HARY. Bus. 
REV. 22 (1974). 
144. Id. at 24. 
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of elaboration from a point of view that treats law as, in Ronald 
Dworkin's sense, integrity. 14 ~ 
The equivalent injury argument assumes that judges in common 
law privacy right jurisdictions are constrained both by an obligation 
to respect institutional traditions concerning the use of precedent 
and by principles of fairness and reasonability. The argument main-
tains that adherence to these constraints point to ascribing privacy 
rights to corporations. Fairness demands that like cases be treated 
alike. Reasonability demands that the logical entailments of princi-
pled thinking be accorded due weight. 
According to the equivalent injury argument, since corporations 
can suffer some types of privacy losses which when suffered by natu-
ral persons entitle them to seek compensation under .a privacy the-
ory, corporations are also entitled to seek compensation under a pri-
vacy theory. This argument must be understood as presuming it 
irrelevant, when it comes to measuring the similarity of injury, that 
losses of corporate privacy result only in economic and reputational 
damages, never emotional pain to the corporation itself. This is not 
a trouble-free presumption, since, as those who rely on the meta-
physical ground for opposing corporate privacy rights point out, 
there is an undeniable respect in which, for example, publicizing the 
contents of a intimate diary and thereby causing embarrassment is 
quite unlike publicizing the contents of an account ledger and 
thereby causing the loss of a real estate deal. Indeed, it could be 
argued that corporate privacy losses are never "highly offensive" in 
the way intentional diminutions of individual privacy sometimes 
are, precisely because corporations lack feelings and sensibilities to 
be injured by such diminutions. 
The most troubling aspect of the argument is its assumption 
that so long as two categories of entities can experience "equivalent 
injury," no legitimate reason exists for drawing distinctions among 
them for the purpose of ascribing rights. Evaluating this assumption 
invites the perspective of the theory of ascription. As indicated, the 
"theory of ascription" refers to the important corner of jurispru-
dence which comes into play whenever the question arises whether a 
right recognized as belonging to one group (e.g., whites, males, 
adults, natural persons) ought to be extended to another (e.g., 
145. R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 95-96 (1986) Dworkin stated: 
[L]aw as integrity accepts law and legal rights wholeheartedly . ... It sup-
poses that law's constraints benefit society not just by providing predictability 
or procedural fairness or in some other instrumental ways but by securing a 
kind of equality among citizens that makes their community more genuine and 
its moral justification .. . . It argues that rights and responsibilities flow from 
past decisions and so count as legal, not just when they are explicit in these 
decisions but also when they follow from principles of personal morality ex-
plicit decisions presupposed by way of justification. 
-
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blacks, females, children, non-natural legal persons). Articulating 
good reasons of principle or policy for the ascription of rights across 
socially significant categories of claimants is one of the factors that 
can make hard legal cases hard. 146 
The metaphysical ground courts have given for rejecting corpo-
rate privacy rights takes on greater plausibility when viewed as a 
serious proposition about judicious ascription. It asserts that a cer-
tain category of plaintiffs lack traits presupposed by a certain right 
and hence should be denied the right. 
There are plain respects in which a right can indeed logically 
presuppose possession of particular traits. Rights of free speech pre-
suppose a capacity or potential for speech acts; the right to life pre-
supposes living; and the right to common law privacy, presupposes 
the ability to achieve states of at least partial inaccessibility to 
others. The Vassar and Oasis Nite Club courts refused to ascribe 
privacy rights to an educational and recreational corporation respec-
tively on the ground that they required wide accessibility to the 
public in order to survive as viable ventures. If the metaphysical ra-
tionale of these cases fails, it is because isolating limited aspects of 
corporate life and property for privacy protection is not logically in-
consistent with the character of a corporation as open for public 
business and contribution. 
An equivalent injury theorist could resort to the contention that 
there are natural persons behind the corporate fiction whom corpo-
rate privacy loss can effect on an emotional level. The point would 
then be not that two diverse entities experience equivalent injuries, 
but that two essentially identical entities experience equivalent inju-
ries. But it surely counts against this point that the privacy interests 
of those who own, manage and are employed by corporations are not 
identical to the corporations' own interests. This is best evidenced 
by privacy invasions actions corporations have attempted to bring, 
never successfully, against their own employees. 147 Thus, if corpora-
tions should have privacy rights it is not simply or primarily because 
the intangible whole can be reduced to its tangible human parts. 
2. The Social Policy Argument 
The social policy argument maintains that society would be bet-
ter off, that is, happier, wealthier, more secure, and/or more just if 
corporations enjoyed freedom from highly offensive intrusion, publi-
cation, and appropriation. 148 It contends that the availability of a 
146. DwoRKIN, HARD CAsEs, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
147. Barr, 529 F. Supp. at 1277 (employer may not recover against employee 
who tape recorded meeting in which employment termination occurred). 
148. I am using "social" here in its most inclusive sense. The "social policy ar-
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civil action for invasion of privacy would lessen if not the likelihood, 
then the consequences of highly offensive injurious privacy losses; 
and concludes, therefore, that the common law action for invasion of 
privacy should be extended to corporations. I have already had occa-
sion to hint at economic versions of the social policy argument in my 
discussion of the corporate preference for privacy. 
As presented, the argument implies that judges should decide 
common law cases with an eye toward the broad ends served by the 
law. It can be read to imply that, when there are questions about the 
ascription of old rights to new classes of common law claimants, 
courts should be guided by specific policy considerations for the 
benefit of the aggregate, rather than by abstract principles gleaned 
from prior case law narrowly construed. 
The minor premise of the "social policy argument" syllogism is 
that the availability of a civil action for invasion of privacy would 
lessen either the likelihood or the consequences of highly offensive 
privacy losses. There is cause to doubt the truth of this premise, as 
we have already seen. It is open to question whether the invasion of 
privacy tort as currently conceived can significantly affect the occur-
rence or consequences of unwanted corporate privacy losses. Other 
bodies of law protect corporate interests in seclusion, secrecy, repu-
tation and publicity, though not perfectly. Extra-legal market bal-
ances and accomodations among competitors probably have protec-
tive impact. 
The social policy argument has a second Achilles heel. The con-
clusion that corporate privacy ought to be further protected has 
been vigorously challenged by Ralph Nader and others. "Corporate 
privacy" is sometimes asserted as a shield behind which lurk failures 
of corporate accountability, responsibility and efficiency. Strikingly, 
two of the few cases decided in the past several years in which cor-
porations have brought privacy claims are cases in which the alleged 
privacy invader utilized surveillance in order to bring to light wrong-
doing for which the corporation later faced civil or criminal prosecu-
tion.149 If rights are to be ascribed where doing so will promote so-
cial "goods," the precise "goods" to be won through the extension of 
the privacy right call out for closer definition. 
gument" I refer to is a composite of an indefinite number of possible arguments with 
logically identical structures but relying on diverse conceptions of social good. Pos-
ner's economic defense of corporate privacy is a social policy argument that defines 
social good in terms of promoting net wealth. 
149. Barr, 529 F. Supp 1277 (tape recordings of employment termination used 
to support age discrimination claim); N.O.C., 484 A.2d 729 (surveillance of corporate 
operations reveal possible zoning violations and improper operation of a hazardous 
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3. Moral Rights 
Doctrinal uncertainty about common law rights is sometimes re-
solved by reference to the putative moral or natural rights of the 
litigants. The privacy theories of Professors Bloustein160 and Wes-
tin101 suggest that business organizations have something akin to a 
moral claim to legal privacy rights, because privacy is desired by and 
beneficial to legitimate business. They seem to suggest that as a 
matter of political freedom in a democratic setting organizational 
privacy ought to be respected. Should corporate moral claims be rec-
ognized, and, if so, should they be deemed to support common law 
privacy rights for corporation? A moral rights argument for common 
law corporate privacy protection is this one. Corporations are mor-
ally entitled to legal rights of privacy adequate to the task of pro-
tecting their reasonable expectations of freedom from others' highly 
offensive acts of intrusion, publication and commercial appropria-
tion. Therefore, courts ought to permit actions for privacy invasion 
to lie on behalf of corporations. 
This argument can have no appeal to positivists who deny that 
legal rights flow directly from any moral or natural rights we may 
have. 102 But the belief that there are rights, knowable by moral rea-
soning or intuition and useful for justifying and criticizing positive 
law, still occupies an important place in American life and 
jurisprudence.103 
However, were the natural law perpsective true, it would not 
follow automatically from the fact that human individuals possess 
background pre-legal rights that corporations possess them as well. 
Corporations are "invisible, intangible, and artificial."104 Human-
kind is said to be endowed with moral or natural rights because 
human beings have traits of rationality, free will, and self-conscious 
understanding. They are persons. Human personhood gives rise to 
reciprocal obligations of good treatment and good behavior because 
it constitutes an inherent reason for according deference to individ-
ual needs and desires. 
This popular account of moral or natural rights renders it prob-
lematic to ascribe extra-legal rights to non-natural persons. But per-
haps there is an argument of a different type to be made for moral 
rights, one which does not exclude corporations. This argument be-
150. E. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY (1979). 
151. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). 
152. Cf. P . SoPHER, A THEORY OF LAw 132 (1984) (equating concepts of moral 
rights and legal rights in critical discussion of their relevance law). 
153. See generally sources cited supra note 5. 
154. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819) (Marshall, 
J.). 
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gins with the premise that moral rights arise out of participation in 
a social practice. Corporations are real participants in a social prac-
tice of independent players which includes a system of laws. This 
system of laws imposes numerous duties and burdens of citizenship 
on the corporation, including tax burdens and liability for injuries to 
others. It also ascribes numerous legal rights to the corporation, to 
protect its interests, for example, in profitability, growth and inno-
vation. The social practice of reciprocal benefits and burdens is the 
source of legitimate expectations that ground claims of a moral right 
to the protection of corporate interests.~~~ 
Further steps are needed to establish that among the moral 
rights of the corporation is a moral right of the legal protection of 
privacy interest in the form of a common law privacy right. Here is 
where "moral rights" arguments must join forces with "equivalent 
injury" and "social policy" arguments in order to complete the case 
for the right sought. Perhaps the best argument that can be made is 
that the moral status of the corporation as a social participant de-
mands that its "equivalent injuries" be compensable; and that social 
justice demands the fullest protection of corporate privacy no less 
than of individual privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments courts have made for denying common law pri-
vacy rights to corporations are in some respects anomalous and fail 
to realistically address corporate needs and preferences. However, as 
I have tried to show, the courts' arguments from corporate nature, 
legal purpose and the adequacy of existing remedies are not wholly 
without a reasonable basis. They make a good deal of sense if one 
accepts what I find difficult to accept, namely that "privacy" can 
only mean human privacy and that the privacy torts have the sole, 
settled purpose of guarding human feelings. 
Any praise to be gleaned from this assessment of arguments 
against common law corporate privacy rights is admittedly faint. 
Praise for the arguments on the other side, in favor of corporate 
rights, must also be faint. The "equivalent injury," "social policy" 
and "moral rights" arguments for corporate privacy rights I have 
sketched unavoidably contain premises that are philosophically con-
troversial and empirically uncertain. Moreover, the excitement of 
the largely unexplored possibility that corporate privacy rights could 
be recognized and put to use for legitimate corporate purposes, per-
155. George Fletcher has argued that the moral basis of tort liability is reciproc-
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1987] Corporate Privacy Rights 639 
haps related to new computer and information technologies or old-
fashioned industrial espionage, is diminished by the presence of case 
law revealing that corporate privacy has been used ignobly to shield 
wrongdoing. 
The importance of privacy to business is plain, the social worth 
of the corporate privacy action, in view of the actual uses to which it 
has been put, less so. Corporate privacy actions attempted as a way 
of "getting back" at whistle-blowing citizens, as in Schaefer, or dis-
gruntled employees, as in Barr, suggest that the corporate privacy 
right might do more to injure the public than to benefit society by 
promoting competition, innovation, and market fairness. 
The question of extending privacy rights to corporations must 
look for a part of its answer in realistic understandings of what cor-
porations are and what they need by way of legal support to sustain 
profitability and to have a beneficial role in American life. There are 
questions of incentive, business practices and actual markets to 
think through. 
But the question of corporate privacy rights must look for the 
most fundamental part of its answer in conceptual accounts of what 
we mean by "privacy" and who or what may have moral and legal 
rights of their own. It must look to the theory of ascription. Legal 
theorists should turn their attention to general, recurrent quandries 
about how hard questions of ascription are best answered. For the 
general quandries, which cannot be sufficiently managed as we re-
flect with particularity on the validity of specific doctrine, loom 
large in our assessments of judicial allocation of particular legal 
rights in common law cases. 
